CAN/CSA-ISO/IEC 11770-3:16

Foreword
Introduction
1 Scope
2 Normative references
3 Terms and definitions
4 Symbols and abbreviations
5 Requirements
6 Key derivation functions
7 Cofactor multiplication
8 Key commitment
9 Key confirmation
10 Framework for key management
11 Key agreement
12 Secret key transport
13 Public key transport
Annex A (normative) - Object identifiers
Annex B (informative) - Properties of key establishment
        mechanisms
Annex C (informative) - Examples of key derivation functions
Annex D (informative) - Examples of key establishment mechanisms
Annex E (informative) - Examples of elliptic curve based key
        establishment mechanisms
Annex F (informative) - Example of bilinear pairing based key
        establishment mechanisms
Annex G (informative) - Secret key transport
Annex H (informative) - Patent information
Bibliography

Specifies key management mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques.

CSA Preface Standards development within the Information Technology sector is harmonized with international standards development. Through the CSA Technical Committee on Information Technology (TCIT), Canadians serve as the SCC Mirror Committee (SMC) on ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 on Information Technology (ISO/IEC JTC1) for the Standards Council of Canada (SCC), the ISO member body for Canada and sponsor of the Canadian National Committee of the IEC. Also, as a member of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Canada participates in the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (ITU-T). For brevity, this Standard will be referred to as "CAN/CSA-ISO/IEC 11770-3" throughout. This Standard supersedes CAN/CSA-ISO/IEC 11770-3:09 (adopted ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008). At the time of publication, ISO/IEC 11770-3:2015 is available from ISO and IEC in English only. CSA Group will publish the French version when it becomes available from ISO and IEC. Scope This part of ISO/IEC 11770 defines key management mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques. It specifically addresses the use of asymmetric techniques to achieve the following goals. a) Establish a shared secret key for use in a symmetric cryptographic technique between two entities A and B by key agreement. In a secret key agreement mechanism, the secret key is computed as the result of a data exchange between the two entities A and B. Neither of them should be able to predetermine the value of the shared secret key. b) Establish a shared secret key for use in a symmetric cryptographic technique between two entities A and B via key transport. In a secret key transport mechanism, the secret key is chosen by one entity A and is transferred to another entity B, suitably protected by asymmetric techniques. c) Make an entitys public key available to other entities via key transport. In a public key transport mechanism, the public key of entity A shall be transferred to other entities in an authenticated way, but not requiring secrecy. Some of the mechanisms of this part of ISO/IEC 11770 are based on the corresponding authentication mechanisms in ISO/IEC 9798-3. This part of ISO/IEC 11770 does not cover certain aspects of key management, such as key lifecycle management mechanisms to generate or validate asymmetric key pairs, and mechanisms to store, archive, delete, destroy, etc. keys. While this part of ISO/IEC 11770 does not explicitly cover the distribution of an entitys private key (of an asymmetric key pair) from a trusted third party to a requesting entity, the key transport mechanisms described can be used to achieve this. A private key can in all cases be distributed with these mechanisms where an existing, non-compromised key already exists. However, in practice the distribution of private keys is usually a manual process that relies on technological means such as smart cards, etc. This part of ISO/IEC 11770 does not specify the transformations used in the key management mechanisms. NOTE To provide origin authentication for key management messages, it is possible to make provisions for authenticity within the key establishment protocol or to use a public key signature system to sign the key exchange messages.