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IEEE DRAFT 603 : D7 JUN 96

Superseded

Superseded

A superseded Standard is one, which is fully replaced by another Standard, which is a new edition of the same Standard.

View Superseded by

CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS

Superseded date

01-01-1999

Superseded by

IEEE 603-2009 REDLINE

Published date

12-01-2013

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1 Scope
1.1 Illustration
1.2 Application
2 Definitions
3 References
4 Safety System Designation
5 Safety System Criteria
5.1 Single-Failure Criterion
5.2 Completion of Protective Action
5.3 Quality
5.4 Equipment Qualification
5.5 System Integrity
5.6 Independence
5.7 Capability for Test and Calibration
5.8 Information Displays
5.9 Control of Access
5.10 Repair
5.11 Identification
5.12 Auxiliary Features
5.13 Multi-Unit Stations
5.14 Human Factors Considerations
5.15 Reliability
5.16 Common Cause Failure Criteria
6 Sense and Command features - Functional and
            Design Requirements
6.1 Automatic Control
6.2 Manual Control
6.3 Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features
            and Other Systems
6.4 Derivation of System Inputs
6.5 Capability for Testing and Calibration
6.6 Operating Bypasses
6.7 Maintenance Bypass
6.8 Setpoints
7 Execute Features - Functional and Design
            Requirements
7.1 Automatic Control
7.2 Manual Control
7.3 Completion of Protective Action
7.4 Operating Bypass
7.5 Maintenance Bypass
8 Power Source Requirements
8.1 Electrical Power Sources
8.2 Non-electrical Power Sources
8.3 Maintenance Bypass
FIGURES
Fig 1 Nonelectrical Interface Scope Diagram
Fig 2 3 x 3 Matrix Representation of Safety System
Fig 3 Examples of Equipment Fitted to Safety System
            Scope Diagram
Fig 4 Scope Diagram for IEEE Std 603 199X
Fig 5 Interpretation of 6.3.1 of IEEE Std 603 199X
APPENDIXES
Appendix A Illustration of Some Basic concepts for Developing
            the Scope of a Safety System
Appendix B Other Standards that Provide Additional
            Information
APPENDIX FIGURES
Fig A1 Power Water Reactors Loss of Coolant Accident
            (LOCA) Safety Functions
Figs A2-A6 Typical Safety System Block Diagram
Fig A3 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling
Fig A4 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling: Reactor
Fig A5 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling: Addition of
            Sense and Command Features
Fig A6 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling: Addition of
            Execute Features
Fig A7 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling: Addition of
            Some Auxiliary Supporting Features
Fif A8 Elements for Emergency Core Cooling: Addition of
            Class 1E Power
Fig A9 Typical Safety Function
Fig A10 Safety Group Example

Establishes minimum functional design criteria for the power, instrumentation and control portions of nuclear power generating station safety systems. These criteria are established to provide a means for promoting safe practices for design and evaluation of safety system performance and reliability, However, adhering to these criteria will not necessarily fully establish the adequacy of any safety system's functional performance and reliability; nonetheless, omission of any of these criteria will, in most instances, be an indication of safety system inadequacy.

DocumentType
Draft
PublisherName
Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers
Status
Superseded
SupersededBy

ANS 51.1-1983(R1988) NUCLEAR SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF STATIONARY PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PLANTS
ANS 52.1-83(R1988) NUCLEAR SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF STATIONARY BOILING WATER REACTOR PLANTS
IEC 60231A:1969 Supplement A - General principles of nuclear reactor instrumentation

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